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Research links the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) with a number of
social cognitive processes that involve reflecting on oneself and
other people. Here, we investigated how mPFC might support the
ability to recollect information about oneself and others relating to
previous experiences. Participants judged whether they had pre-
viously related stimuli conceptually to themselves or someone else,
or whether they or another agent had performed actions. We uncov-
ered a functional distinction between dorsal and ventral mPFC subre-
gions based on information retrieved from episodic long-term
memory. The dorsal mPFC was generally activated when participants
attempted to retrieve social information about themselves and
others, regardless of whether this information concerned the con-
ceptual or agentic self or other. In contrast, a role was discerned for
ventral mPFC during conceptual but not agentic self-referential recol-
lection, indicating specific involvement in retrieving memories
related to self-concept rather than bodily self. A subsequent recog-
nition test for new items that had been presented during the recollec-
tion task found that conceptual and agentic recollection attempts
resulted in differential incidental encoding of new information. Thus,
we reveal converging fMRI and behavioral evidence for distinct neu-
rocognitive forms of self-referential recollection, highlighting that
conceptual and bodily aspects of self-reflection can be dissociated.
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Introduction
Much cognitive neuroscience research indicates a strong link
between social cognition and the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) across various tasks and cognitive domains (Amodio
and Frith 2006; Mitchell 2009). Within the mPFC, a dorsal–
ventral functional gradient has often been observed (Northoff
and Bermpohl 2004; Moran et al. 2011). Whereas the dorsal
mPFC is linked with processing social information about
people in general (e.g., Hassabis et al. 2013), the ventral mPFC
is more engaged when processing information in relation to
oneself (Mitchell et al. 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2007; Denny
et al. 2012; Wagner et al. 2012). Furthermore, activation in the
ventral mPFC is most often elicited in tasks that involve proces-
sing conceptual as opposed to bodily aspects of the self (e.g.,
reflections on one’s personality traits rather than judgments of
agency), whereas the latter tends to be associated with acti-
vation in sensorimotor and posterior cortical regions (Blake-
more and Frith 2003; Gillihan and Farah 2005; Powell et al.
2010). Hence, the ventral mPFC may be a core component in a
network of medial cortical regions that are specifically
dedicated to conceptual self-referential processing (e.g.,
Gusnard et al. 2001; Kelley et al. 2002; Powell et al. 2010; Mar-
tinelli et al. 2013; although see Roy et al. 2012).
Episodic memories—recollections of personally experi-
enced events—are intrinsically self-related, and are critical for
our sense of a coherent identity that extends across time
(Schacter et al. 2007). However, episodic memory may involve
different degrees or types of self-referential processing, de-
pending both on how information is initially encoded as well
as on the type of information oriented towards during sub-
sequent retrieval (e.g., Summerfield et al. 2009). During episo-
dic encoding, relating information to one’s concept of self
(e.g., “Does the word intelligent describe you?”) improves later
memory and is associated with greater ventral mPFC activity
compared with relating the same information to another
person (e.g., “Does the word intelligent describe President
George Bush?”; Kelley et al. 2002). Furthermore, the level of
activation in ventral mPFC predicts the magnitude of the later
memory advantage for self-encoded items (Macrae et al. 2004;
see also Leshikar and Duarte 2011). Another type of self-
related processing—interacting with the world as an agent as
opposed to watching another person perform an action—also
enhances memory encoding (e.g., Cohen 1983; Engelkamp
and Zimmer 1989). However, this enactment-based memory
effect has been related to the involvement of motor-planning
regions during encoding of self-performed actions rather than
the mPFC (Powell et al. 2010), consistent with a distinction
between bodily and conceptual aspects of self (see also
Lind 2010).
During episodic retrieval, remembering conceptual infor-
mation that was encoded in relation to oneself as opposed to
another person activates the mPFC (Fossati et al. 2004; Benoit
et al. 2010). In contrast, remembering self-performed actions
compared with verbal descriptions of actions activates sensori-
motor regions (e.g., Nyberg et al. 2002). Such similarity
between cortical activation at encoding and retrieval is pre-
dicted by the transfer-appropriate processing framework,
which proposes that successful retrieval involves the reinstate-
ment of neurocognitive processes that were active at the time
of encoding (Morris et al. 1977; Rugg et al. 2008). Interestingly,
asking participants to remember whether they or another
person performed an action activates the mPFC compared with
other types of memory judgments (Brandt et al. forthcoming;
Vinogradov et al. 2006; Simons et al. 2008). This finding raises
the possibility that orienting towards social agency infor-
mation (“was it me or you?”) during retrieval judgments
engages mPFC-mediated cognitive processes that are not
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automatically elicited during retrieval of self-performed
actions without a social element (cf. Nyberg et al. 2002).
However, to our knowledge, no previous study has tested the
extent to which agentic versus conceptual self/other judg-
ments in recollection involve the recruitment of the same
neural system, a question that formed the main focus of the
current study.
We also tested another, complementary prediction related to
the transfer-appropriate processing framework, namely that if
retrieval involves reinstating the neurocognitive processes
engaged when initially encoding an experience, then each re-
trieval attempt is potentially also an encoding event. Hence, if
participants reinstate distinct types of neurocognitive pro-
cesses depending on the type of information they are trying to
retrieve, this may in turn affect the incidental encoding of
novel information presented in a retrieval test. Previous re-
search has shown that new “foil” words presented during an
old/new recognition test tend to be incidentally encoded, as as-
sessed by a surprise subsequent recognition test for the foils,
and that such incidental encoding is enhanced if the foils are
first encountered intermixed with semantically encoded old
words compared with phonologically encoded old words
(Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, et al. 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova
2005). Because semantic processing typically leads to enhanced
memory compared with phonological processing (Craik and
Tulving 1975), this finding suggests that people strategically
reinstate a semantic processing mode when attempting to re-
trieve semantically encoded information, and a phonological
processing mode when attempting to retrieve phonologically
encoded information (see also Marsh et al. 2009; Danckert et al.
2011). In the current study, we examined whether orienting re-
trieval towards the conceptual self would lead to differential en-
coding of new information compared with orienting retrieval
towards the agentic self, as might be expected if these types of
processing modes are distinct.
These questions were addressed in an fMRI experiment in-
volving source judgments about agentic or conceptual self-
referential memory. During study, participants viewed lists of
person-descriptive words that were first read out loud either
by the participant or the experimenter. Next, participants
judged how well the person-descriptive word applied either to
themselves or the President of the USA, Barack Obama (Kelley
et al. 2002). During a subsequent scanned test, participants
were presented with the words again, intermixed with new
“foil” words. Participants were asked on a trial-by-trial basis to
remember either whether they themselves or the experimenter
had spoken the word, or whether it was new (orienting retrie-
val towards agentic self/other information); or, whether they
had related the word to themselves or Obama, or whether it
was new (orienting retrieval towards conceptual self/other
information). A third nonepisodic control condition was also
included. Following scanning, a surprise recognition test as-
sessed whether agentic and conceptual recollection attempts
had led to different degrees of incidental encoding of foils.
We predicted that both types of episodic recollection task
would activate dorsal mPFC compared with the nonepisodic
control condition, since both episodic tasks involve consider-
ing social information. In contrast, since the ventral mPFC is
particularly linked to conceptual self-referential processing,
we expected enhanced activation during recollection of
person-descriptive words that participants had related to them-
selves rather than Obama during study. Finally, engaging such
distinct self-referential retrieval processes when asked to re-
trieve conceptual versus agentic information, may, in turn,
result in encoding differences of new items that served as
lures. In that case, participants were expected to show differ-
ences in subsequent recognition of foil items from the concep-
tual versus agentic retrieval task.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighteen right-handed healthy native English speakers (5 male, 13
female, mean age = 22.5 years, and range 19–29), with normal or cor-
rected to normal vision were screened using a comprehensive medical
questionnaire and gave written informed consent before entering the
MRI scanner. Participants received £30 in compensation for taking
part. The study was approved by the University of Cambridge Psychol-
ogy Research Ethics Committee.
Materials
Stimuli consisted of 288 person-descriptive words (e.g., “gentle,
jealous, bossy”) derived from Dumas et al. (2002). These words were
split into 16 lists of 18 items each that were matched for word length,
likableness, familiarity, and Kucera–Francis word frequency (Wilson
1988). List assignment to conditions was fully counterbalanced across
participants.
Design and Procedure
After initial practice of one study and one test phase, participants com-
pleted 16 study-test cycles in the scanner. Each study-test cycle was
∼2.5 min, meaning that the total time in the scanner was ∼40 min, plus
short breaks. Only the test phases were scanned to avoid movement ar-
tifacts in the fMRI data due to the participant speaking during the
study phase.
A study phase consisted of 8 trials. Each trial began with a 500 ms
fixation cross followed by a person-descriptive word that appeared in
the center of the screen for 500 ms, after which a cue at the top of the
screen appeared for 3000 ms indicating who was to read out the word,
either the participant or the experimenter (indicated by a “neutral” or
an “experimenter” face symbol respectively, see Fig. 1). Participants
spoke the word out loud on Subject trials and listened to the exper-
imenter speaking the word over the intercom in Experimenter trials.
Subsequently, a second cue appeared at the bottom of the screen for
another 3000 ms indicating whether the participant had to judge the
extent to which the person-descriptive word applied to either him/
herself or to Obama (indicated by a “pointing hand” or an “Obama
2008” symbol respectively, see Fig. 1). Participants made their judg-
ment via 4 buttons with their right hand (“sure no”, “unsure no”,
“unsure yes”, and “sure yes”). These 2 study phase factors were fully
crossed, and 2 trials of each possible combination were presented in a
pseudorandom order (not more than 3 repetitions of the same con-
dition) in each study phase.
The subsequent source memory test phases comprised 18 trials
each, in which participants were presented with person-descriptive
words in the center of the screen that had either previously been seen
or were new, and were asked one of 3 questions. Six trials in each
phase assessed memory for whether items had been read out loud by
the participant or the experimenter during study, or whether they were
new (the “Agentic condition” or “Agentic task”), with 2 items of each
old type and 2 new foils); 6 assessed memory for whether items had
been related to the participant or to Obama during study, or whether
they were new (the “Conceptual condition” or “Conceptual task”), with
2 items of each old type and 2 new foils); and 6 trials required partici-
pants to judge the number of letters in novel personality trait words
(the “Control condition” or “Control task”). The order of test questions
was pseudorandom to ensure that the same question was not repeated
more than 3 times in a row, and that the last item presented during the
preceding study phase was not the first item presented at test.
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Each trial began with a 475 ms fixation cross, after which one of the
3 questions appeared at the top of the screen (“Who Said it?” for
Agentic recollection, “Who Related to?” for Conceptual recollection, or
“Letters?” for Control), for a total duration of 4500 ms. One second
after the question appeared, the person-descriptive word appeared in
the center of the screen for 3500 ms, and participants were required to
respond within this time (see Fig. 1). For each question, symbols at the
bottom of the screen indicated the 3 different answers participants
could choose between (Agentic recollection: “SUB”, subject said it;
“EXP”, experimenter said it; “NEW”, the word is new. Conceptual re-
collection: “YOU”, related it to themselves; “OBA”, related it to Obama;
“NEW”, the word is new. Control condition: “<8”, fewer than 8 letters;
“8–10” between 8 and 10 letters; “>10”, more than 10 letters. These
word length values were chosen since approximately one-third of
items fell within each category). In all conditions, participants were in-
structed to use the duration of their button press to indicate their levels
of confidence in their answer, with higher confidence indicated by a
longer button press. When pressing a button, the font color of the
chosen option would initially turn green, and the font color would
change from green towards red with continued button press.
Postscan Foil Recognition Test
After completing the experimental phases, participants undertook a
surprise test outside of the scanner, which assessed their recognition
memory for foils that had been previously presented during the test
phase of the prior experiment. All previously seen foil words from the
Agentic and Conceptual test conditions (32 items in each condition,
2 from each of the preceding 16 test phases) were pseudorandomly in-
termixed with completely new person-descriptive words (64 items),
and were presented for 3500 ms in the center of the screen. The new
person-descriptive words for the foil test were also selected from
Dumas et al. (2002) and had similar characteristics to the words in the
main experiment, but were not counterbalanced across the other con-
ditions because our hypothesis only concerned differences in recog-
nition performance for foils that had been previously seen in the
agentic versus conceptual source memory tests. Participants were in-
structed to judge a word as “old” if it had been presented earlier in any
phase of the experiment, and to respond “new” if the word had not
been presented during any phase of the experiment. Responses were
given on a 4-point confidence scale (“sure old”, “unsure old”, “unsure
new”, and “sure new”).
Postscan Similarity Test
Finally, following the foil recognition test, participants undertook a
test to measure their perceived personality similarity with President
Obama. In this similarity test, participants made judgments about
Obama using the person-descriptive words that they had previously
related to themselves in the study phase and vice versa. In this way,
participants provided both a self and an Obama rating for each word.
In order to measure the extent to which participants perceived
themselves as similar to President Obama, Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients were computed between the self and Obama judgments. These
served as a similarity index, and were Fisher Z transformed. It has been
suggested that self-referential processes are also applied when consid-
ering someone who is perceived as similar to the self (e.g., Mitchell
et al. 2006). As a corollary, one would engage similar encoding pro-
cesses when judging oneself and that similar other person, which
would result in less discriminable memory traces (Benoit et al. 2010).
Figure 1. Stimuli examples in the study (left column) and test (right column) phases. In the study phase, a symbol at the top of the screen indicated whether the participant (a
“plain” face) or the experimenter (a face resembling the experimenter) should speak the word out loud. A symbol at the bottom of the screen indicated whether participants should
judge how well the word reflected themselves (pointing hand) or the US President Obama (the “Obama 2008” campaign logo). In the test phase, a question at the top of the screen
indicated to participants whether they should remember who had spoken the word at study (Agentic recollection), remember who the word had been related to at study
(Conceptual recollection), or make a nonepisodic Control judgment. Top left: a word spoken by the participant at study (Subject) that they also related to themselves (You). Top right:
the same word tested with the Conceptual recollection question. Bottom left: a word spoken by the Experimenter at study that the participant related to Obama. Bottom right: a
new word tested with the Agentic recollection question.
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Thus, individuals who perceived themselves as more similar to Obama
should be worse at remembering whether they had related a word to
themselves or Obama during study (Benoit et al. 2010).
FMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
Structural MPRAGE images and functional images were acquired with
a 3T Siemens Allegra system (repetition time = 2250 ms, echo time =
30 ms, 36 interleaved axial slices oriented ∼10–20° from the AC–PC trans-
verse plane, 2 mm thickness, 1 mm interslice skip, 192 mm field of
view [FOV], 64 × 64 matrix). In order to allow for T1 equilibration, the
first 4 volumes from each session were discarded.
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 (Welcome De-
partment of Imaging Neuroscience, London). All acquired images for
each participant were realigned with respect to the first for motion cor-
rection and all slices were resampled in time to match the middle slice.
Participants’ structural scans were coregistered to their mean func-
tional image, and the coregistered structural scan was segmented to
separate out gray matter and generate normalization parameters. Next,
these normalization parameters were used to normalize the realigned
and slice-timing corrected functional images into 3-mm cubic voxels in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) stereotactic space (Cocosco et al.
1997). The normalized images were then spatially smoothed with an
8-mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analysis of random effects was undertaken in 2 stages. In
the first stage, the 16 sessions were concatenated and delta functions
representing onset times of the experimental conditions of interest
were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function
after discarding onsets that fell in the last 16 s of a session since their
response could not be accurately modeled. Sessions were concatenated
due to the low number of trials in each functional run to ensure an ade-
quate trial number for the estimation of each regressor (e.g., Benoit
et al. 2010). A subject-level model was used to estimate the parameters
for each regressor, with movement parameters in the 3 directions of
motion and 3 degrees of rotation included as vectors of no interest to
avoid movement confounds. However, with concatenated functional
runs, it is not possible to use the standard SPM high-pass filter, which
would treat the runs as one continuous time-series. We thus included
the following regressors in order to control for temporal drifts and for
run-specific mean activation levels: a linear-trend predictor, a
6-predictor Fourier basis for nonlinear trends (sines and cosines of up
to 3 cycles per run) and a confound-mean predictor (Kriegeskorte et al.
2008).
For the episodic tasks, 6 separate regressors coded the onsets of: 1)
old items in the Agentic recollection task that participants had spoken
during study and that received an accurate source judgment (the
“Subject” condition); 2) old items in the Agentic recollection task that
the experimenter had spoken during study and that received an accu-
rate source judgment (the “Experimenter” condition); 3) correctly
identified New items in the Agentic recollection task; 4) old items in
the Conceptual recollection task that participants had related to them-
selves during study and that received an accurate source judgment (the
“You” condition); 5) old items in the Conceptual recollection task that
participants had related to Obama during study and that received an
accurate source judgment (the “Obama” condition); 6) correctly ident-
ified New items in the Conceptual recollection task. Regressors 7–10
consisted of new items in the Control task that received an accurate
letter number judgment and that were randomly split into quarters and
modeled with 4 separate regressors. This split was implemented
because one analysis of interest involved investigating common acti-
vation for both old and new items during both episodic tasks com-
pared with the Control condition, thus splitting Control trials into 4
allowed each episodic condition to be compared against an indepen-
dent baseline. A final 11th regressor coded old and new items from any
task for which participants gave no response or the wrong response
with the purpose of removing noise variability from the first level stat-
istical model.
In a second analysis, another first level model was created to investi-
gate differences between old items in the different recollection tasks
based on whether the participant had related a word to themselves or
Obama during study, irrespective of whether the experimenter or
participant had spoken the word out loud. This analysis included the
same regressors as above with the exception that old items were
grouped according to You versus Obama study condition in both
retrieval tasks.
In the second stage of each analysis, the beta estimates from the first
level were entered into a general linear model treating subjects as a
random effect. The mPFC was defined as an a priori region of interest.
Coordinates of the anterior rostral medial PFC region identified by
Amodio and Frith (2006) as specifically sensitive to social cognition
were used to create a mask for small-volume correction. The mask had
a posterior boundary at the edge between the corpus callosum and the
anterior cingulate cortex (approximate Y coordinate 31), left and right
boundaries at MNI X coordinates −15 and 15, respectively, the lower
boundary on the horizontal plane approximately at MNI Z coordinate
4, and an upper boundary line passing through approximate MNI
points (50, 41) and (30, 15) as defined by Steele and Lawrie (2004, see
Fig. 5). This mask was smoothed with a 8 mm FWHM kernel, and acti-
vations within this mPFC region were characterized using an uncor-
rected height threshold of P < 0.001 with a minimum cluster size of 10
voxels, reported as significant when the peak exceeded the small-
volume corrected family-wise error threshold of P < 0.05. Activations
outside the mPFC were reported when they were significant at P < 0.05
whole-brain family-wise error corrected, with a minimum cluster size
of 10 voxels. The approximate Brodmann’s areas of significant clusters
were estimated using the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas and the
Talairach daemon software, after adjusting coordinates to allow for
differences between the MNI and Talairach templates using a nonlinear
transform (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach).
Results
Source Memory Test Results
Table 1 shows the behavioral data from the scanned retrieval
test phases. Note that old recognition rate was calculated as the
proportion of items in old conditions that were attributed to
either of the 2 sources irrespective of source accuracy. For
source accuracy, we used the raw proportion accurate responses
for each condition. In the first step, we tested for typical self-
referential effects, whereby items that participants had related to
themselves or spoken out loud were predicted to be associated
with higher memory accuracy than items that participants had
related to Obama or that had been spoken by the experimenter.
Planned comparisons confirmed that self-encoded conditions
were associated with significantly higher old recognition rate
than other-encoded items in both memory tasks (Subject vs.
Experimenter: t(17) = 2.87, P = 0.011; You vs. Obama: t(17) = 2.21,
P = 0.042), in line with a large body of previous research. How-
ever, there were no significant differences between Subject-
and Experimenter-spoken items in the Agentic recollection











Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM Mean SEM
Agentic
Subject 0.63 0.04 1970 74 433 35 0.94 0.01
Experimenter 0.71 0.03 2023 54 406 31 0.90 0.01
New 0.96 0.01 1346 74 683 52
Conceptual
You 0.77 0.03 1987 80 531 49 0.93 0.01
Obama 0.75 0.03 2163 60 455 40 0.91 0.01
New 0.97 0.01 1398 77 681 53
Control 0.87 0.02 1622 87 601 39
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Confidence (all P > 0.14). You- and Obama-related items in the
Conceptual recollection task were also not significantly differ-
ent for source accuracy (t < 1, ns), but You items were associ-
ated with significantly shorter RTs (t(17) = 4.52, P = 0.0003) and
higher Confidence (t(17) = 4.12, P = 0.0007) than Obama items.
Next, we compared performance across the 2 recollection
tasks. This analysis was important for interpreting any putative
differences between foils on the subsequent foil recognition
task, because previous research has shown that later recog-
nition tends to be more accurate for foils that are presented in-
termixed with studied items that are more accurately
remembered in the initial retrieval test (e.g., Jacoby, Shimizu,
Daniels et al. 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova 2005). Compar-
ing all old items in the Agentic and Conceptual tasks against
each other, irrespective of study conditions, showed that both
source accuracy and confidence was significantly higher for
Conceptual source memory judgments than Agentic source
memory judgments (accuracy: t(17) = 3.20, P = 0.005; confi-
dence: t(17) = 2.87, P = 0.011). However, the 2 memory tasks
did not differ in reaction time (t(17) = 1.63, P = 0.12). There
were no significant differences between Agentic and Concep-
tual new items on any measure (accuracy: t(17) = 1.37, P = 0.19;
RT: t(17) = 1.72, P = 0.10; confidence: t(17) < 1, ns). Thus, per-
formance for new foils was highly similar across tasks in the
source memory test, suggesting that any subsequent differ-
ences on the foil recognition test (next section) cannot be
simply explained by differences in processing effort or study
time during initial encoding in the first test.
Performance in both recollection tasks was also compared
against performance in the Control task. This analysis assessed
whether potential behavioral differences between memory and
Control tasks could explain the fMRI activations seen for both
old and new items in the episodic retrieval tasks when com-
pared with the Control condition (see fMRI Results section). Pre-
viously seen items in the recollection tasks were associated
with lower accuracy (Agentic Subject: t(17) = 5.52, P = 0.00004;
Agentic Experimenter: t(17) = 3.72, P = 0.002; Conceptual You:
t(17) = 2.93, P = 0.009; Conceptual Obama: t(17) = 3.35, P = 0.004)
and longer reaction times (Agentic Subject: t(17) = 3.94, P =
0.001; Agentic Experimenter: t(17) = 5.33, P = 0.00006; Concep-
tual You: t(17) = 4.19, P = 0.001; Conceptual Obama: t(17) = 7.38,
P = 0.000001) than the Control condition. Old items were also
associated with significantly lower confidence than Control
items (Agentic Subject: t(17) = 4.30, P = 0.0005; Agentic Exper-
imenter: t(17) = 6.28, P = 0.000008; Conceptual Obama:
t(17) = 4.93, P = 0.0001), with the exception of items that the par-
ticipant had related to themselves during study, which only
showed a trend for lower confidence (Conceptual You:
t(17) = 1.89, P = 0.08). In contrast, new items in both recollection
tasks were associated with higher accuracy (Agentic New:
t(17) = 3.38, P = 0.004; Conceptual New: t(17) = 4.37, P = 0.0004)
and confidence ratings (Agentic New: t(17) = 2.45, P = 0.026;
Conceptual New: t(17) = 2.33, P = 0.032) and shorter reaction
times (Agentic New: t(17) = 3.95, P = 0.001; Conceptual New:
t(17) = 2.96, P = 0.009) than the Control condition. This behavior-
al pattern thus means that any common episodic task effects on
brain activity that occurred for both old and new items com-
pared with the Control task cannot be explained by simple
differences in accuracy, RT, or confidence.
Consistent with prior research, participants who thought of
themselves as more alike to Obama (as shown by the similar-
ity index) were significantly less accurate at remembering
whether a word had been related to themselves or Obama
(r(16) =−0.53, P = 0.024). By comparison, there was no signifi-
cant relationship between the similarity measure and perform-
ance on the Agentic recollection task (r(16) =−0.15, P = 0.56).
The difference between these correlation coefficients was at
trend-level according to a Williams t-test for dependent corre-
lations (t(15) = 1.49, P = 0.08, one-tailed). Thus, consistent with
the hypothesis that one would also engage self-referential (en-
coding) processes when thinking about someone similar to
oneself (Mitchell et al. 2006; Benoit et al. 2010), people who
perceived themselves as more similar to Obama found it more
difficult to subsequently remember whether they had in fact
made conceptual judgments about themselves or Obama.
Foil Recognition Results
Despite highly similar behavioral performance for foils during
their initial exposure, they were not remembered equally well
on a subsequent foil recognition test. The hit rate was signifi-
cantly higher for foils that had been presented with a Conceptual
than Agentic retrieval question during the preceding source
memory test (Conceptual: mean proportion correct = 0.66, SEM
= 0.03; Agentic: mean proportion correct = 0.57, standard error
of the mean (SEM) = 0.03; t(17) = 3.18, P = 0.005). RT and confi-
dence measures did not differ across the 2 types of foils (Concep-
tual: mean RT (ms) = 1745, SEM = 307; Agentic: mean RT
(ms) = 1715, SEM= 207; Conceptual: mean proportion confident
responses = 0.45, SEM= 0.04; Agentic: mean proportion confi-
dent responses = 0.44, SEM = 0.04; both ts < 1, ns). Thus, the
results support the hypothesis that retrieval of conceptual versus
agentic self-referential information rely on different neurocogni-
tive processes.
FMRI Results
We first discuss the simple retrieval effects (episodic task
effects and basic old/new effects) and then turn to the critical
and more complex analysis of the activation differences as a
function of both study condition and retrieval task.
General Episodic Task Effects Compared with Control
The first fMRI analysis investigated common effects of episodic
retrieval instructions compared with the Control condition, ir-
respective of retrieval task and memory status (old vs. new) of
the items. A conjunction analysis was conducted on individual
contrasts between Agentic old > Control, Agentic new >
Control, Conceptual old > Control and Conceptual new >
Control. Because these contrasts used the same Control con-
dition they were not statistically independent, which can bias
the conjunction statistical test. Therefore, it would be inap-
propriate to report the t-values generated by this nonindepen-
dent conjunction analysis. Instead, common activation across
contrasts was defined as regions where each effect was inde-
pendently significant at the specified threshold, and the con-
junction analysis was only used to localize the peaks in this
overlap. T-values for those peaks were reported for each indi-
vidual contrast.
A region of interest (ROI) analysis focusing on the mPFC
region that has previously been implicated in social cognition
(using a mask based on coordinates identified by Amodio and
Frith (2006) for small-volume correction) confirmed that all
episodic conditions did indeed activate a relatively dorsal
cluster in the left mPFC (Table 2; Fig. 2A). An exploratory
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analysis testing for regions outside the mPFC that were com-
monly activated for old and new items in both retrieval tasks
showed further activations in the medial parietal and left
lateral temporo-parietal cortex, left inferior frontal and left
middle temporal regions (Table 2).
To verify the reliability of the above findings, a further analy-
sis was conducted where trials in the Control condition were
randomly split into quarters and used as 4 independent base-
lines for the episodic task conditions. The conjunction
between these independent contrasts was calculated, which
confirmed that all peaks identified in the pooled analysis were
also significant when using independent Control conditions
(Table 2), although the independent conjunction analysis was
obviously less powerful.
General Old versus New Effects
The next analysis investigated regions commonly activated
during correct source memory judgments for old items com-
pared with correct identification of new items, irrespective of
retrieval task and study condition. This analysis was performed
to assess whether there were any task-independent effects of
episodic retrieval success in the mPFC, which might be ex-
pected if the mPFC mediates postretrieval processing of social
information across both agentic and conceptual domains. A
conjunction analysis was conducted on the individual contrasts
between Agentic old > new, and Conceptual old > new, which
revealed no significant activations within the mPFC ROI, but
several significant clusters in the whole-brain analysis, includ-
ing regions in the left inferior lateral and medial parietal
cortex, left dorsolateral PFC, medial frontal cortex, bilateral
anterior insula and striatum (Table 3). The reverse conjunction
contrast, testing regions more activated for new than old items,
revealed 2 highly significant clusters in secondary visual
regions, as well as a smaller right parietal cluster (Table 3).
Differences Between Old Items as a Function
of Self-Referential Encoding and Retrieval Task
The final, critical analysis investigated the hypothesis that mPFC
would be differentially involved in self-related episodic recollec-
tion as a function of both 1) the type of self-referential proces-
sing engaged at study and 2) the retrieval test requirements.
This involved contrasting old words related to the self or Obama
(You >Obama) during the Conceptual recollection task, and
contrasting old words spoken aloud by the participants or
experimenter (Subject > Experimenter) during the Agentic re-
collection task. In line with previous research (Benoit et al.
2010), self-related words significantly increased ventral mPFC
activation compared with other-related words in the Conceptual
recollection task (one large ventral cluster with 163 voxels at x,
y, z: −9, 53, 13, t = 4.67, see Fig. 2B; a second smaller dorsal
cluster with 13 voxels at x, y, z: 6, 59, 31, t = 3.69). However, no
similar self-reference effect was found on trials when partici-
pants judged whether they or the experimenter had spoken the
word (there were no self > other activation differences for
Agentic recollection in the mPFC). In fact, both clusters in the
You >Obama contrast in the Conceptual recollection task were
still significant when exclusively masked with a leniently thre-
sholded (P < 0.05, uncorrected) Subject > Experimenter contrast
in the Agentic recollection task, indicating that self > other
mPFC activation differences were restricted to conceptual self-
referential memories. A second analysis separated old items in
the Agentic recollection task based on whether the participant
had related the word to themselves or Obama. This analysis re-
vealed no significant mPFC differences, showing that the self-
referential effect was task dependent.
Finally, to verify that the response in the ventral mPFC was
indeed qualitatively different from the dorsal mPFC activation
pattern, we extracted the percent signal change values from
ventral and dorsal regions and ran a region (dorsal/ventral) ×
old condition (Agentic Subject, Agentic Experimenter, Concep-
tual You, and Conceptual Obama) Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on these values. However, as the ventral peak in our
main analysis was defined by a contrast that was nonorthogonal
to the effect tested for in the current analysis, it would be inap-
propriate to extract signal from this peak because doing so
might bias the significance of the results (an example of “double
dipping”, see Kriegeskorte et al. 2009). Therefore, we defined
the ventral peak based on a recent meta-analysis by Denny et al.
(2012), which demonstrated a maximum difference between
self- and other-referential processing in the ventral mPFC (coor-
dinates: −10, 50, 6) across 48 studies. Percent signal change ex-
tracted from this ventral peak was compared with percent signal
change in our dorsal peak (coordinates: −12, 59, 25, Fig. 2A),
since the latter was defined based on an orthogonal contrast
(common activation for old and new items in the episodic tasks
Table 2
fMRI activations associated with episodic retrieval mode that were common across retrieval task and old/new item memory status

















Left Superior frontal gyrus 10 −12 59 25 68 4.87 4.72 6.44 5.45 3.73
Whole-brain analysis
Bilateral Precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex 7/23/31 −6 −55 37 427 14.56 10.88 14.26 10.33 8.79
Left Middle temporal gyrus/superior
temporal gyrus
21/22 −57 −37 1 194 7.72 7.95 9.65 8.29 6.71
Left Inferior frontal gyrus 47/45/46 −45 29 −5 146 8.77 8.07 9.49 7.58 6.49
Left Superior temporal gyrus/angular gyrus 39 −42 −61 28 251 9.39 7.33 10.82 7.3 5.61
BA, approximate Brodmann area.
Notes: Activation within the mPFC was initially height thresholded at P< 0.001 uncorrected, >10 voxels and subsequently small-volume corrected at P< 0.05 family-wise error (FWE). Activation outside
the mPFC was thresholded at P< 0.05 FWE corrected for the whole brain, >10 voxels. Coordinates (x, y, and z) are cluster peaks from a conjunction analysis of the 4 simple effects in MNI space. T-values
at these peaks are reported from simple contrasts of episodic conditions versus the pooled control condition, and from a conjunction analysis where the control trials were split into 4 independent baselines.
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compared with control, collapsed across Study condition) to
that tested in the current ANOVA and thus not statistically
biased. This analysis confirmed a significant interaction
(F3,51 = 6.66, P = 0.001).
Discussion
In the current study, we investigated the brain regions that
support different types of self-referential processing during epi-
sodic retrieval. Previous research has revealed a functional gra-
dient in the mPFC during nonepisodic tasks, whereby the
dorsal mPFC appears to have a general role in social cognition
whereas the ventral mPFCmay have a specific role in conceptual
self-referential processing (Northoff and Bermpohl 2004; Mitch-
ell et al. 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2007; Moran et al. 2011;
Denny et al. 2012; Wagner et al. 2012; Martinelli et al. 2013).
Based on the assumption that episodic retrieval involves a rein-
statement of the neurocognitive processes that are engaged
when perceiving and comprehending an initial event (Morris
et al. 1977; Rugg et al. 2008), we predicted that a similar distinc-
tion would be observed during recollection. Consistent with our
predictions, the dorsal mPFC was generally activated when
participants attempted to retrieve social information, whereas
the ventral mPFC was specifically activated during recollection
of information that was previously encoded with reference to
participants’ conceptual self.
Dorsal mPFC activation was found for both old and new
items in both episodic tasks, and for both self-encoded and
other-encoded old items in comparison to the nonepisodic
control condition. Importantly, these common episodic task
effects on brain activity cannot be explained by similar behav-
ioral performance for these conditions when compared with
the control condition, because new and old items in the episo-
dic tasks were associated with very different behavioral pro-
files. Participants were faster, more accurate and more
confident when making memory judgments on new items in
the episodic tasks than when making letter judgments on new
items in the control task. In contrast, they were slower, less
confident and less accurate for old items in the episodic tests
when compared with control task performance. Thus, general
episodic task-related activity in the dorsal mPFC suggests that
this region can be confidently linked to episodic retrieval pro-
cesses without potentially confounding behavioral differences.
Furthermore, since similar activation levels were found in this
Figure 2. fMRI activations in the mPFC associated with self/other recollection. Effects in A and B are thresholded at P<0.001 (uncorrected), with a minimum cluster size of 10
voxels, and inclusively masked to display only activations within the mPFC region associated with social cognition in Amodio and Frith (2006). Effects in (C) are thresholded at
P<0.05 family-wise error corrected for the whole brain, with a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels. The percent signal change bar graphs (A and B) plot the mean difference
between each displayed condition and the nonepisodic Control task extracted from the peak voxel in each mPFC cluster. (A) A dorsal mPFC region with a peak at [−12, 59, 25]
showed enhanced activation for both old and new items in both recollection tasks, compared with the Control condition. (B) a ventral mPFC region with a peak at [−9, 53, 13]
showed selective activation for old items that participants had processed in relation to their conceptual self during study, and only when the retrieval task required recollection of
conceptual self/other information. (C) In a whole-brain analysis, general old > new effects (old > new collapsed across retrieval task; red) were associated with a very different
activation pattern from episodic retrieval task effects (episodic tasks > Control task; green), except in the precuneus where the 2 effects overlapped.
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region for both old and new items in the episodic tasks, this
suggests that the dorsal mPFC was not engaged based on recol-
lection success, but rather may mediate preretrieval processes
that are recruited to facilitate recollection (see e.g., Rugg and
Wilding 2000; Benoit et al. 2009). Activation in this region for
both self- and other-encoded items is consistent with previous
findings that dorsal mPFC is generally engaged during social
cognition (e.g., Wagner et al. 2012; Hassabis et al. 2013).
In contrast, activation in the ventral mPFC was dependent
on both the type of information initially encoded and the type
of information participants were asked to retrieve. When par-
ticipants were asked to retrieve whether they had related a
person-descriptive word to themselves or another person,
ventral mPFC was particularly engaged for items that had been
encoded in relation to their concept of self compared with the
concept of another person, but no similar conceptual self >
other difference was found in the agentic recollection task. Nor
was there an enactment-related difference in this region
between items that had been spoken out loud by the partici-
pant versus items that had been spoken by the experimenter.
This selective response in the ventral mPFC is highly consistent
with previous findings relating this region specifically to con-
ceptual rather than bodily self-referential processing (e.g.,
Powell et al. 2010), and with the more general argument that
conceptual and bodily aspects of self are dissociable (e.g., Bla-
kemore and Frith 2003; Gillihan and Farah 2005; Lind 2010;
see also Williams 2010, for a somewhat different distinction).
There are several interesting aspects of this effect in the
ventral mPFC. First, because it was dependent on the encoding
conditions of particular stimuli, recruitment of this region
appears to be contingent on successful retrieval of conceptual
self-information, consistent with previous findings (e.g., Fossati
et al. 2004; Benoit et al. 2010). Thus, ventral mPFC may mediate
postretrieval processing of recollected information rather than
preretrieval processes relating to retrieval attempts (Rugg and
Wilding 2000). Second, conceptual self > other differences in
the ventral mPFC were only found during the conceptual recol-
lection task and not during the agentic recollection task,
suggesting that the self-referential process mediated by this
region was not automatically elicited, but rather was flexibly
engaged based on task demands. Previous research on self-
referential processing in nonepisodic tasks have shown that
ventral mPFC activity is enhanced for conceptually self-relevant
stimuli even when the task does not require explicit self-
referential judgments (e.g., Rameson et al. 2010). However,
such automatic effects have primarily been found for stimuli
that are very strongly self-relevant, such as personal semantic
facts (Moran, et al. 2009). In our task, although participants
encoded person-descriptive words in relation to their concep-
tual self highly successfully (as judged by their subsequent accu-
rate source memory for those words), such episodic encoding
appears not to have elicited automatic self-referential processing
to the same degree as did personal semantic facts in Moran
et al.’s experiment.
The behavioral data showed that both self-enactment and
conceptual self-referential processing resulted in enhanced
recognition memory, in line with typical findings (Rogers et al.
1977; Engelkamp and Zimmer 1989). However, neither self-
enactment nor conceptual self-referential processing enhanced
source memory accuracy for the self-relevant source, which
has sometimes been found in the previous literature (e.g.,
Serbun et al. 2011). The lack of source memory effects in our
study is however difficult to interpret, because we were unable
to correct our source memory measure for response biases
(such as the “it had to be you” effect, Johnson et al. 1981), as
done in previous studies (e.g., Serbun et al. 2011). Estimating
response biases requires an examination of the type of errors
participants make to new items, but new item accuracy was at
ceiling in our data. Therefore, our behavioral source memory
results are not very informative on this point since if there were
self-referential effects on source accuracy in our study, these
may have been obscured by response biases that we were
unable to measure. Nevertheless, despite similar behavioral
outcomes, the fMRI results indicate that self-referential effects
due to performing an action versus relating information to
one’s concept of self have distinct neural underpinnings, since
only the latter was associated with ventral mPFC engagement.
Interestingly, performance on the conceptual recollection
task was weaker for participants who rated themselves as
more similar to Obama, replicating previous research (Benoit
et al. 2010). This pattern supports the view that similar self-
referential processes are also applied when thinking about
people considered similar to oneself (Mitchell et al. 2006;
Benoit et al. 2010). That is, employing similar processes during
encoding would lead to less discriminant memory traces,
which, in turn, would make it more difficult to remember
whether one had made the initial judgment about oneself or
the similar other person.
We provided further evidence for 2 dissociable forms of self-
reflection—conceptual versus agentic—by examining the fate of
items that served as foils during the main memory task. Specifi-
cally, if people can intentionally orient retrieval towards either
type of self-referential information, this might lead to differential
incidental encoding of new information encountered during the
2 retrieval tasks. Previous research has shown that incidental en-
coding of new information is enhanced if that new information
is tested in the same context as old information that was particu-
larly effectively encoded during a preceding study phase. These
observations have been taken to suggest that people strategi-
cally reinstate encoding processes during retrieval attempts
(e.g., Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels et al. 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu,
Velanova 2005; Marsh et al. 2009; Danckert et al. 2011). In our
Table 3
Whole-brain fMRI activation differences between old and new items common to both episodic
retrieval tasks.






39/40 −33 −55 40 124 7.85
Left Middle frontal gyrus 9/46 −39 8 40 230 7.5
Left Superior frontal gyrus/
cingulate gyrus
6/8/32 −6 17 46 125 7.41
Left Precuneus 7 −6 −67 34 99 7.04
Left Anterior insula 13 −27 26 1 53 6.82
Left Basal ganglia Striatum −12 5 −2 16 6.04
Right Basal ganglia Striatum 9 5 −2 22 5.87
New> Old
Left Cuneus 18 −9 −94 16 128 9.14
Right Lingual gyrus 18 12 −70 −2 78 7.47
Right Supramarginal gyrus 40 54 −28 28 28 5.75
Notes: Presented effects are thresholded at P< 0.05 FWE corrected for the whole brain, >10
voxels (there were no common old/new effects in the mPFC). Coordinates (x, y, and z) are cluster
peaks in MNI space from a conjunction analysis between 2 old/new simple contrasts within each
of the episodic retrieval tasks.
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experiment, participants were more accurate at judging whether
a personality word had been related to themselves or President
Obama than judging whether a word was spoken by themselves
or the experimenter, suggesting that conceptual self-referential
processing led to more effective encoding than agentic self-
referential processing. In the final recognition test for items pre-
sented as foils in the preceding main experiment, foils were
more accurately recognized if they had previously been pre-
sented with a conceptual self/other retrieval question than an
agentic self/other retrieval question. This final test difference oc-
curred despite highly similar behavioral performance for foils
during their initial exposure, suggesting that it cannot be simply
explained by differences in processing effort or study time
during the first test.
Instead, our findings are more consistent with the view that
people engaged distinct types of self-referential processing in
response to the different test questions, in an attempt to strate-
gically constrain retrieval to either conceptual or agentic self-
referential information. Most previous research (e.g., Jacoby,
Shimizu, Daniels et al. 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova 2005;
Marsh et al. 2009; Danckert et al. 2011; Halamish et al. 2012)
has demonstrated such retrieval orientation effects on encod-
ing using some form of level-of-processing manipulation
(Craik and Tulving 1975), which typically produces very large
effects on encoding. To our knowledge, ours is the first dem-
onstration that even very subtle differences between retrieval
attempts—in this case, attempting to retrieve distinct types of
self-referential information—can produce differential inciden-
tal encoding of new information.
The current research has demonstrated a distinction within
the mPFC during episodic recollection that is consistent with
the previously proposed dorsal–ventral gradient for general
social cognition versus conceptual self-referential processing
(e.g., Wagner et al. 2012). However, the functional significance
of this gradient remains to be determined, as the exact nature
of processing or representation mediated by mPFC regions is
still unclear (see e.g., Mitchell 2009). It is also not known
whether the link between mPFC and social cognition is indica-
tive of a specialized “module”, or whether the mPFC mediates
more general cognitive processes that happen to be particu-
larly engaged during these types of tasks.
According to one view, activations in the mPFC indicate that
conceptual self-referential enhancements of memory are the
result of a unique type of processing that is qualitatively differ-
ent from general semantic processes, since the latter are typi-
cally associated with left lateral prefrontal regions (Kelley et al.
2002). Another view suggests that the concept of self is a par-
ticularly rich and elaborate semantic schema, and that relating
information to this schema facilitates encoding (e.g., Kihlstrom
et al. 2003). Accordingly, self-referential effects may only be
quantitatively different from other semantic effects on encod-
ing. Consistent with the latter view, recent evidence suggests
that general schema-related memory enhancements are
mediated by the mPFC even when the schema in question is
neither obviously socially- nor self-relevant (reviewed in Van
Kesteren et al. 2012). Thus, future research should aim to de-
termine whether self-referential and general schema-related
effects on memory involve similar recruitment of the mPFC.
An alternative line of research has focused on the role of the
mPFC in value judgments during decision making. Recent re-
search in this field has suggested that the self/other gradient in
the mPFC is not fixed, but that dorsal and ventral mPFC
process both self- and other-related information depending on
whether that information is relevant to a currently executed or
alternative, nonexecuted choice (Nicolle et al. 2012). Based on
such evidence suggesting that the ventral mPFC may not
support self-representations per se, D’Argembeau (2013) has
suggested that this region may instead evaluate or represent
the personal value or significance (i.e., the worth or impor-
tance of something for an individual) of externally and intern-
ally generated information. Since self-referential information
tends to be considered more personally significant, this region
tends to be more active during self-referential than other-
referential processing. According to this view, the ventral
mPFC activity pattern observed in the current study may be
due to participants attaching particularly high personal signifi-
cance to the recollection that a personality descriptive word
had previously been related to their conceptual self compared
with other types of recollected information.
In conclusion, our findings demonstrate a fractionation
between different sub-regions within the mPFC that are
engaged during recollection of different types of self-
referential information, supporting the view that the self is not
a unitary phenomenon. Rather, the brain regions that process
information about our conceptual self appear partially nono-
verlapping with the brain regions that process information
about our bodily self. Whereas previous research has demon-
strated this distinction during on-line processing of perceptual
information in the environment, our findings show a similar
dissociation when processing information retrieved from epi-
sodic long-term memory.
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